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Physician Retaliation: Can the Physician-
Patient Relationship Be Protected?
Once most people treated me as a friend and a confidant
.... These days the malpractice threat has created a definite
wedge between a physician and some of his patients.1
I. Introduction
A generation ago, physicians enjoyed the respect, trust, faith,
and even love of their patients. In recent years, technological ad-
vances in medicine, medical specialization, medical consumerism,
and threats of malpractice suits have all created tension in the doc-
tor-patient relationship.2
Medical malpractice suits, in particular, have distanced doctors
from their patients. In the wake of two decades of malpractice insur-
ance crises," doctors began practicing "defensive medicine."" Now
some doctors choose not to treat certain patients at all. 5 Other times
doctors agree to treat, but impose certain "ground rules" that the
patient must agree to before treatment will begin.6
Express contractual agreements increasingly create and control
the physician-patient relationship.7 In an effort to reduce exposure to
malpractice liability, some health care practitioners employ contracts
1. Gibbs, Sick and Tired, TIME, July 31, 1989, at 48 (quoting Boyd McCracken, Sr.,
M.D., a family practitioner from Greenville, 11.). Dr. Boyd recalls the days when he made late-
night house calls. Id.
Today, malpractice lawsuits create emotional stress in the physician-patient relationship
and within physicians' lives. See Charles, Wilbert & Kennedy, Physician Self-Reports of Re-
actions to Malpractice Litigation, 141 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 563, 565 (1984) ("A malpractice
suit [is] considered a serious and often a devastating event in the personal and professional
lives of the respondent physicians.").
2. Gibbs, supra note 1, at 49.
3. For discussions about the malpractice insurance crises of the 1970s and 1980s, see
generally Gastel, Medical Malpractice, INS. INFO. INST., Oct. 1989 (Lexis, Nexis library,
Omni file); Nye, Gifford, Webb & Dewar, The Causes of the Medical Malpractice Crisis: An
Analysis of Claims Data and Insurance Company Finances, 76 GEo. L.J. 1495 (1988) [here-
inafter Malpractice Crisis].
4. See infra notes 64-72 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 21-42, 54-62 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 80-81, 164-66 and accompanying text.
7. Express contracts control the physician-patient relationships in Health Maintenance
Organizations (HMO's), Preferred Provider Organizations (PPO's), and Individual Practice
Associations (IPA's). These organizations offer an alternative to the traditional fee-for-service
approach to health care. For a consideration of the contract issues raised by alternative medi-
cal practice forms, see J. Lemkin, Alternative Delivery Systems: HMOs, PPOs, and CMPs, in
R. MCNAIR. HEALTH CARE, LEGAL RESPONSES TO NEW ECONOMIC FORCES (1985). This
Comment is limited to the contracts promulgated by private fee-for-service physicians.
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that expressly modify patients' legal rights.8 One type of contract
attempts to limit the amount of legal assistance a physician gives to
a patient, both during and after treatment. 9 Doctors who employ this
contract hope to discourage litigious patients from seeking their
medical services.
Doctors may also try to avoid malpractice liability by refusing
to treat certain patients altogether. These doctors attempt to circum-
vent legal confrontation by refusing to treat laywers,' 0 persons who
have been involved in past litigation," and "high risk" individuals
such as obstetrical patients. 2
The steep rise in professional malpractice insurance costs's an-
gers medical providers. Opinions differ as to where the blame for the
problem lies.' 4 Many doctors consider lawyers to be responsible for
their costly insurance bills. These physicians believe that lawyers
bring frivolous malpractice claims solely to make money and they do
so without regard for the effects lawsuits have on insurance rates.15
In an attempt to "get even" with attorneys, some doctors refuse to
cooperate with the legal process on behalf of a treated patient.'" Un-
fortunately, it is the patient who is punished, rather than the
attorney.
This Comment explores the measures doctors have taken to
avoid both liability litigation and involvement in the legal process.
The Comment focuses on the effects these actions have had on pa-
tient treatment, patient rights, and physician-patient relationships.
The Comment concludes with suggestions to help reduce the antago-
nism found between doctors and lawyers and to help protect the pa-
tient from becoming a pawn in the battle.
II. The Physician-Patient Relationship
A. Creation of the Relationship
Traditionally, the relationship between a doctor and patient is
8. See infra notes 79-80, 163-65 and accompanying text.
9. See infra note 80.
10. See infra notes 59-62 and accompanying text.
II. See infra notes 23-38 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 39-42, 53-58 and accompanying text.
13. The American Medical Association [hereinafter AMA] estimates that, on average,
15 percent of the total amount of revenue spent on physician services is attributable to rising
liability costs. Gastel, supra note 3.
14. A number of candidates have been cited as the culprit: avaricious lawyers, negligent
doctors, litigious patients, and greedy insurers. Malpractice Crisis, supra note 3, at 1497.
15. Interview with LeRoy Smigel, J.D., member of the Dauphin County Bar Associa-
tion, Committee on Interprofessional Relations, in Harrisburg, Pa. (Sept. 20, 1989).
16. Id.
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based upon an express or implied contract. A patient offers to enter
into a contract by going to the doctor's office with a particular prob-
lem and the doctor accepts the offer by examining the patient. 17 Un-
like parties in a traditional contract scenario, however, the patient
and physician are not considered to be dealing at "arms length."' 8
Instead, the physician is considered to have greater bargaining power
as a result of superior knowledge. Therefore, the law imposes certain
obligations upon doctors that are not imposed upon patients.19
Once established under contract law, the doctor-patient rela-
tionship is regulated primarily by tort law.20 Yet, many doctors are
now turning to contract principles in an attempt to restrict the com-
mon law parameters of tort regulations.
B. Duty To Treat: Taking Advantage of the "No Duty" Rule
It is well settled that, in the absence of an implied or express
contract, a physician is under no initial duty to treat a person requir-
ing medical services.2 This common-law rule applies even in emer-
gency situations.22 Doctors can refer to the rule as their grant of
authority for refusing to treat certain patient groups including indi-
gents, lawyers, obstetrical patients, and those who have been party to
17. This interchange creates an implied contract, the most common contract between
patients and fee-for-service physicians. Whether a physician-patient relationship has been cre-
ated is a question of fact, and courts have been quite flexible in determining that an implied
contract has been formed. See, e.g., Hiser v. Randolph, 126 Ariz. 608, 617 P.2d 774 (Ct. App.
1980) (accepting "on-call" status in hospital imposes duty of care); O'Neill v. Montifiore
Hosp., II A.D.2d 132, 202 N.Y.S.2d 436 (1960) (doctor who talks with patient on telephone
creates implied contractual obligation to patient); Lyons v. Grether, 218 Va. 630, 239 S.E.2d
103 (1977) (physician-patient relationship was established merely by the scheduling and ac-
ceptance of an office appointment). See also Annotation, What Constitutes Physician-Patient
Relationship For Malpractice Purposes, 17 A.L.R. 4TH 132 (1982).
18. Doctors are expected to act as fiduciaries in their dealings with patients. See Wither-
ell v. Weimer, 85 111. 2d 146, 421 N.E.2d 869 (1981), rev'd on other grounds, 118 I11. 2d 321,
515 N.E.2d 68 (1987); Louden v. Mhyre, 110 Wash. 2d 675, 756 P.2d 138 (1988).
19. These obligations include a duty to use a particular standard of care and a duty not
to terminate the relationship except under certain circumstances. See infra notes 74-76 and
accompanying text.
20. For a historical discussion of tort law control over the patient-physician relationship,
see Atiyah, Medical Malpractice and the Contract/Tort Boundary, 49 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 287 (Spring 1986).
21. Hurley v. Eddingfield, 156 Ind. 416, 59 N.E. 1058 (1901); Childs v. Weis, 440
S.W.2d 104 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969).
22. There is no legal duty to treat in an emergency situation, although there is an ethical
duty to treat. The AMA has established a code of medical ethics which suggests that a physi-
cian should treat an individual when an emergency arises. See AMA, PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL
ETHICS, Principle VI (1980).
In addition, 49 states and the District of Columbia have adopted Good Samaritan stat-
utes. These statutes protect health care professionals who render emergency aid from civil
liability for damages if they cause any injury. See generally Annotation, Construction and
Application of "Good Samaritan" Statutes, 68 A.L.R. 4TH 294 (1989).
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litigation. Fear of litigation may be the primary reason why doctors
turn these patients away.
1. "Litigious" patients.-In 1985, Physician's Alert, a private
computerized service that identifies patients who have-filed lawsuits,
began accepting subscribers in Detroit, Chicago, and Los Angeles. 3
Since then, the service has expanded nationally.2' The service data
base includes lawsuits filed for medical malpractice, products liabil-
ity, and personal injury.25 Physician's Alert was established to
"[eradicate] the adversarial aspects of the doctor-patient relationship
so that doctors will feel more comfortable treating patients." 2 Turn-
ing potentially litigious patients away, or charging them more to
cover possible malpractice costs, 27 can make physicians feel better
protected from the brunt of a malpractice claim.
Physician's Alert founders have no concern about potential ethi-
cal abuses of the service by doctors since the service makes no judg-
ment or recommendation about the validity or merit of cases re-
ported.2 Likewise, there is little concern about violation of patients'
privacy rights because the service data base consists of matters that
are of public record. 9
Opponents and proponents of Physician's Alert have debated
the propriety of the service under the strictures of the Hippocratic
Oath.30 Those opposed to the service argue that the Oath does not
allow discrimination against persons who have filed lawsuits. 31 Those
in favor of the service point out that the Oath requires doctors to
23. Tapp, Service Allows Doctor to Screen Plaintiff-Patients, Chi. Daily L. Bull., Mar.
19, 1985, at 1, col. 2; Shwiff, Service Promises to Help Physicians Identify Plaintiffs, L.A.
Daily J., Oct. 23, 1985, at 1, col. 2. For a fee, doctors can call Physician's Alert to find out in
a matter of seconds whether a potential patient has ever filed a lawsuit. When the Los Angeles
County Medical Association announced it would subscribe to the service, the Los Angeles
Trial Lawyers Association voted to set up a telephone hotline to help consumers find out how
many times their doctors have been sued for malpractice. See Frank, Tit for Tat?, A.B.A. J.,
Feb. 1986, at 22; Galante, Doctors. Attorneys Feud Over 'Hotline' in Calif., NAT'L L.J., Dec.
2, 1985, at 9, col. 1.
24. Physician's Alert serves Colorado, Dallas, Miami, and New York. Elmer-Dewitt, An
Electronic Assault on Privacy?, TIME, May 19, 1986, at 13.
25. Shwiff, supra note 23. The data base does not include divorce or child custody cases.
Id. In Los Angeles, subscribers are referred to Apograph, a Los Angeles based company that
will further research the cases for additional fees. Id.




29. For an informative examination of privacy issues in the computer age, see D. Li-
NOWES, PRIVACY IN AMERICA (1989).
30. See Shwiff, supra note 23; Galante, supra note 23.
31. Galante, supra note 23.
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treat anyone in an emergency situation, so the service does not pre-
vent seriously ill or injured patients from receiving treatment.32
The potential abuses feared by the use of Physician's Alert at
its inception have not materialized. Early surveys of Physician's
Alert subscribers show that only a small number of users have re-
fused to treat people whose names appeared as plaintiffs." In addi-
tion, the Los Angeles County Medical Association ended its promo-
tional agreement with the hotline not long after the agreement was
made, due to a lack of response .3  The Association admits that it is
still concerned about malpractice suits, but claims that "most [Los
Angeles] doctors . . . aren't interested in turning patients away."3
Abuse of data bases like Physician's Alert is possible because of
the nature of such systems. Few laws regulate the quality and accu-
racy of data bases in general.3 6 Regulations that do exist generally
do not reach the private use of electronic information." Although
Congress and state legislatures are beginning to protect personal in-
formation privacy, lawsuits and other matters of public record will
probably receive minimal, if any, protection.
Although Physician's Alert seems to have lost physician sup-
port, doctors continue to express an aversion to treating potential liti-
gants.3 8 If this attitude persists, individuals that have been party to
32. Shwiff, supra note 23. Actually, the Hippocratic Oath does not require physicians to
treat in an emergency. The Oath, once considered the sine qua non of medical ethics, is now
regarded as merely an "interesting antique." See C. CHAPMAN, PHYSICIANS, LAW AND ETHICS
25 (1984). In ancient times, physicians were craftsmen. Id. The concept of ethics implicit
within the Oath operated only as a source of guidelines for members of the medical trade. Id.
In modern times, medical professional organizations recognize the problems of individualism in
the Oath. The new medical ethical codes provide for the needs of patients and society, as well
as physicians. See, e.g., AMA, PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETHICS (1980). Today, physicians who
base ethical decisions on the Hippocratic Oath open themselves to any number of sanctions,
both legally and professionally.
33. Shwiff, supra note 23. About two percent of the doctors surveyed in Detroit refused
to treat prior litigants. Id. Physician's Alert founder Michael Eckstein was not aware of any
situation in which an individual was denied medical treatment because of a "computer black-
list." Elmer-Dewitt, supra note 24, at 14.
34. Pasternak, Physicians Hang Up On Legal Hot Line, L.A. Times, Sept. 14, 1986,
Metro Section Part 2, at 1, col. 2 (home ed.).
35. Id. (quoting David Zeitlin, Director of Communications, Los Angeles County Medi-
cal Association). A physician glut in large cities is one reason some doctors are reluctant to
turn patients away. Id.
36. For federal statutory regulations, see Computer Matching and Privacy Protection
Act of 1988, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (1988). For state statutory regulations see, e.g., Information
Practices Act of 1977, CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798-1798.78 (Deering 1981 & Supp. 1990); Pri-
vacy Protection Act of 1976, VA. CODE ANN. §§ 2.1-377.1 to -386 (1987 & 1989 Supp.).
37. One exception is the federal Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988, 18 U.S.C. § 2710
(1988), which bars retailers from selling or disclosing video rental records without a customer's
permission. For a review of the current federal laws designed to protect personal information
privacy, see Rothfeder, Is Nothing Private?, Bus. WK., Sept. 4, 1989, at 74.
38. Whether they use Physician's Alert or not, doctors are still trying to identify poten-
• 969
94 DICKINSON LAW REVIEW SUMMER 1990
any type of litigation will find it harder to gain access to health care.
2. Obstetrical Patients.-A 1988 survey conducted by the
American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists indicates "that
one out of eight physicians specializing in obstetrics has stopped de-
livering babies due to the threat of malpractice suits." 9 In Florida,"'
one in four obstetricians has left the field."1 Earlier studies suggest
that rural areas suffer the most as a result, of this exodus.
4 2
Obstetrics is a "high-risk" specialty' 3 with extraordinarily high
insurance premiums." Well-respected physicians have been forced
out of practice by the financial burden of malpractice costs.45 Pro-
posed and implemented solutions to the problem focus on reducing
medical malpractice insurance costs.4" The implemented solutions
have already begun to ease the crisis. For example, recent tort, re-
form measures have resulted in fewer malpractice claims47 and lower
jury awards for damages. 4'8 This, in turn, has helped to check the
rapid increases in malpractice premiums. Several major insurers
have, for the first time in more than a decade, reduced their
premiums."'
Proposals that seek to encourage doctors to return to practice
include: (1) controlling the legal costs of suits;5" (2) spreading the
tial plaintiffs. "It really dictates what happens at the office. If I feel I have people who are
litigious, I prefer not to take them as patients." Linda Bolton, M.D., a pediatrician in Birming-
ham, Mich., quoted in Gibbs, supra note 1, at 52. Even before Physician's Alert existed,
doctors sometimes refused to treat patients who were known to sue. One woman from Joliet,
Illinois who filed a malpractice suit was subsequently denied treatment by 30 other physicians.
Elmer-Dewitt, supra note 24, at 14.
39. Gastel, supra note 3 (reporting survey results). See also Our Delivery Practice is
Faltering, PEOPLE, June 9, 1986, at 36 [hereinafter Delivery Practice Faltering].
40. Florida has the highest malpractice insurance premiums of all 50 states. See gener-
ally Malpractice Crisis, supra note 3; Gastel, supra note 3.
41. Delivery Practice Faltering, supra note 39, at 36.
42. Gastel, supra note 3 (reporting study findings); Delivery Practice Faltering, supra
note 39, at 37-39.
43. Other "high risk" specialties include neurology and anesthesiology. See Delivery
Practice Faltering, supra note 39, at 40-41.
44. Ob/gyn specialists were expected to pay an average of $72,439 in insurance premi-
ums for the year 1986-1987, about 23 percent of their gross revenues. See Malpractice Crisis,
supra note 3, at 1506-07.
45. Delivery Practice Faltering, supra note 39, at 38-39.
46. Id. at 40-41. See also Gastel, supra note 3.
47. See Gastel, supra note 3. A second reason for fewer malpractice claims is that phy-
sician-owned insurance companies are exposing incompetent doctors more quickly than state
boards do. See Schwartz & Mendelson, The Role of Physician-Owned Insurance Companies
in the Detection and Deterrence of Negligence, 262 J. A.M.A. 1342 (1989). There are obvious
financial incentives in preventing negligent colleagues from generating malpractice suits.
48. Gastel, supra note 3.
49. Id.
50. Id. (citing an April 1988 report from the New York Department of Insurance).
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malpractice costs of high-risk specialties; 1 and (3) creating cost dif-
ferentials for malpractice insurance depending upon a physician's ge-
ographic location. 2 When doctors feel less threatened by the risk of
significant financial losses and professional humiliation, they will feel
more comfortable about remaining in high-risk specialties.
3. Other Victims.-Indigent patients create liability risks, 53
yet physicians are unable to cover their liability insurance costs be-
cause there is no compensation for their services. Thus, many physi-
cians have limited or discontinued the provision of gratuitous ser-
vices.54 Some state legislatures have attempted to remedy this denial
of access to health care. These legislatures have passed laws that
provide immunity from tort liability for physicians who provide free
health care services, unless the care was grossly negligent. 5
Indigents and other patients frequently seek medical care from
academic health centers. University-sponsored health care centers
conduct the majority of the nation's clinical research and offer pa-
tients state-of-the-art technology. Due to rising medical malprac-
tice insurance costs, doctors have increased referrals of high-risk pa-
tients to specialists, who in turn refer the patients to teaching
clinics. 7 These clinics are at the end of the referral chain, and may
likewise begin refusing treatment to certain patients out of fear of
malpractice claims.58
Finally, many lawyers must seek medical care outside of their
hometown or practice areas because local doctors will not accept
them as patients.59 Not surprisingly, doctors often refuse to treat
lawyers that have filed malpractice claims against them. 0 In addi-
tion, doctors also refuse to treat the attorneys' families and employ-
51. Id.
52. Delivery Practice Faltering, supra note 39, at 41 (statement of consumer advocate
Robert Hunter).
53. Benson v. Mays, 245 Md. 632, 227 A.2d 220 (1967) (duty of a physician to exercise
ordinary care when treating a patient arises regardless of whether services are rendered gratui-
tously or for consideration).
54. See generally 16 STATE HEALTH LEGIs. REP. (May 1988).
55. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-571 (Supp. 1989); FLA. STAT. § 768.13 (1986
& Supp. 1989); GA. CODE ANN. § 51-1-29.1 (Harrison Supp. 1987); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I11,
4405 (1978); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2904 (Supp. 1989); S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-55-
210 (Law. Co-op. 1987); VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-106 (1988 & Supp. 1989).
56. See Gastel, supra note 3.
57. See Challoner, Kilpatrick, Dockery & Dwyer, Effects of the Liability Climate on
the Academic Health Center, 319 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1603, 1604 (1988).
58. Id.
59. See Hengstler, MDs Won't Deliver, A.B.A. J., July 1, 1986, at 20.
60. Id.
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ees.6 1 Even though a lawyer never filed a suit against a particular
doctor, the doctor still may refuse to treat the lawyer.62 Occasion-
ally, doctors will not administer treatment to someone who has sued
one of the doctor's colleagues."3
C. Standard Of Care: Leave No Stone Unturned
Physicians may decide to treat a patient who has previously
filed a lawsuit, but will order additional tests, prescribe more treat-
ment, and keep more notes on the patient.64 This phenomenon is
termed "defensive medicine." 6 Currently, defensive medical prac-
tices are creating conflicts between consumers and the medical
profession.
A recent Gallop Poll revealed that seventy-five percent of the
responding physicians believe that fear of malpractice suits causes
them to order more clinical tests than they believe are necessary. 6 A
companion public opinion poll showed that sixty-one percent of the
consumers questioned believe doctors do perform too many tests.
6 7
Understandably, doctors believe widespread testing offers signif-
icant protection against malpractice claims. Failure to diagnose has
been a classic basis for negligence actions against physicians. The
additional precautions, however, have become costly. In 1985, about
$15 billion was spent on defensive medicine. 8 These expenditures
included time-consuming, uncomfortable procedures. For instance,
obstetricians began to deliver babies by caesarean section because
this procedure can be less risky than vaginal delivery.69 Today, about
one-fourth of all births are by caesarean section.70
Plaintiff's attorneys believe that the added precaution has




64. Gibbs, supra note 1, at 52.
65. See generally Gibbs, supra note 1.
66. Gastel, supra note 3 (telephone poll of 1,000 physicians conducted by the Gallup
Organization and sponsored by the AMA).
67. Id. Fifteen hundred randomly selected United States residents over 18 years of age
were polled. Other findings from the Gallup surveys indicate: (1) "Forty-eight percent of the
public believe that 'people who sue physicians for malpractice are just looking for an easy way
to make money; (2) fifty-four percent think that malpractice awards . . . are too high; and (3)
sixty-two percent of the public support capping pain and suffering awards." Id.
68. See Burda, Liability Reshapes Hospital/Physician Relationships, HOSPITALS, Apr.
5, 1987, at 56, 59.
69. Gibbs, supra note 1, at 53.
70. Id.
71. See generally Saks, In Search of the 'Lawsuit Crisis', 14 LAW, MED., & HEALTH
CARE 77 (1986) (discussing the theory that medical malpractice suits have targeted truly neg-
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ers are realizing that defensive medicine may create a false sense of
security to all parties concerned.7 2 The public, once in favor of thor-
ough medical testing, now wants less testing and more explanation.
73
III. The Duty to Maintain the Physician-Patient Relationship:
Modification by Contract?
A. Duty Not to Abandon Treatment
Once the doctor-patient relationship has been established, the
treating physician is under a general legal duty to not abandon treat-
ment.7 4 Under certain circumstances, however, a physician may le-
gally terminate the relationship. For example, a doctor and patient
can mutually agree to end their contract. A physician may also ter-
minate the relationship after providing the patient with reasonable
notice of termination 75 and the opportunity to locate acceptable sub-
stitute care. 6
B. Contracts for Medical Abandonment: Can Physicians Termi-
nate Patient Treatment if Legal Assistance is Requested?
Physicians and patients can expressly agree to limit the amount
of health care services to be provided.77 A new question in health
care law is whether freedom of contract allows physicians to legally
and ethically terminate patient treatment when a patient who be-
comes involved in litigation asks for the physician's litigation assis-
tance. Since this is a novel issue, case law addressing the question is
sparse. Some cases raise analogous issues,78 but the legal boundaries
are only beginning to form.
An example from Pennsylvania exemplifies this novel question
in the doctor-patient relationship. Some Pennsylvania physicians,
ligent doctors).
72. See Harns, Defensive Medicine: It Costs, But Does it Work?, 257 J. A.M.A. 2801
(1987) (failure to follow up test results creates an even greater source of liability).
73. Gibbs, supra note I, at 50 (45% of the 1,012 American adults surveyed by TIME/
CNN on April 4-5, 1989 believe that doctors do not explain enough about procedures).
74. See generally, Comment, Medical Abandonment, 31 MED. TRIAL TECH. Q. 306
(1985).
75. Termination is usually accomplished by registered mail, return receipt requested.
See Hirsh, Dispatching Unwanted Patients, LEGAL ASPECTS OF MED. PRAC., Jan. 1986, at 7.
76. Lee v. Dewbre, 362 S.W.2d 900 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962); Ricks v. Budge, 91 Utah
307, 64 P.2d 208 (1937). See also Payton v. Weaver, 131 Cal. App. 3d 38, 182 Cal. Rptr. 225
(1982) (unmanageable, uncooperative, and self-destructive behavior on part of patient is
grounds for patient termination).
77. This contractual arrangement is most commonly promulgated under HMO, PPO,
and IPA contracts. See supra note 7.
78. See infra notes 82-107.
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practicing in high-risk specialties, 79 require patients to sign a new
type of consent form. Simply stated, the document informs patients
that the physician will provide copies of the patient's medical records
upon written request and patient authorization. The doctors refuse to
provide letters, reports, depositions, or otherwise "assist[] patients in
developing lawsuits."8 One form warns patients that medical treat-
ment will be terminated if the patient insists upon cooperation from
the doctors.81 The patient's signature on these consent forms indi-
cates agreement with the terms and conditions of treatment.
When a 'patient tries to obtain the physician's litigation assis-
tance, regardless of the type of litigation the patient is pursuing,
these contracts are invoked. The contracts raise a number of
concerns.
79. Neurological surgery and orthopedics are the practice areas focused upon.
80. The forms read in full:
CUMBERLAND ORTHOPAEDIC ASSOCIATES, LTD.
Our primary concern is the medical care and treatment of our patients, not
assisting patients in developing lawsuits. It is becoming increasingly difficult for
us to comply with the numerous requests for reports from patients and their
attorneys. Consequently, please be advised that we will no longer prepare written
reports for a patient's attorney or others concerning a patient's condition, treat-
ment or prognosis. We will, however, upon written request, provide a patient
with copies of his or her medical records, upon payment of the costs of
photocopying.
We reserve the right upon proper notice to terminate our services to any
patient who insists that we provide reports or letters, or appear in person or by
phone, in connection with a patient's pursuit of legal remedies.
By signing below, the undersigned agrees to accept the services of Cumber-
land Orthopaedic Associates, Ltd. upon the terms and conditions set forth
herein.
Policy statement concerning confidential medical information provided to patients and their
attorneys, Cumberland Orthopaedic Assoc., Ltd. (copy on file at the Dickinson Law Review
office) [hereinafter Cumberland Orthopaedic Associates, Ltd.].
NEUROLOGICAL SURGERY, LTD.
POLICY STATEMENT:
CONFIDENTIAL MEDICAL INFORMATION PROVIDED TO
ATTORNEYS
We are committed to maintaining a high level of specialty care for our
neurosurgical patients. Each year this seems to require more and more
paperwork, further encroaching upon the time we have available to spend with
our patients. We want to assist you in your medical needs as much as possible,
but we cannot become involved in time-consuming legal work.
Accordingly, we will readily make copies of your medical records from our
office available to your attorney upon receipt of his/her written request, in accor-
dance with a current signed authorization from you. However, we will not pro-
vide depositions for your attorney or for opposing attorneys. Also, we will not
respond to requests from attorneys for separate additional reports summarizing
or restating the same information.
Your signature below will attest to your understanding and acceptance of
the above-stated policy of Neurological Surgery, Ltd.
Policy Statement: Confidential Medical Information Provided to Attorneys, Neurological Sur-
gery, Ltd. (copy on file at the Dickinson Law Review office).
81. Cumberland Orthopaedic Associates, Ltd., supra note 80.
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1. The Duty to Render Full Medical Treatment Includes a
Duty to Render Litigation Assistance.-Some jurisdictions hold that
a treating physician has a duty to render reasonably required litiga-
tion assistance to the patient. New Jersey recently adopted this view
in Spaulding v. Hussain.82 In Spaulding, the plaintiff sustained per-
manent orthopedic and neurological injuries when he slipped on
grease and fell into a pit at a scrap metal yard.83 His injuries re-
quired surgery, repeated hospitalizations, and rehabilitation." Plain-
tiff's primary treating physician was Dr. Hussain. 5 The plaintiff
filed a negligence action against the scrap yard owner and sought to
solicit litigation assistance from his physician. 6 Dr. Hussain agreed
to testify upon advance notice. 7 The doctor was given the requisite
notice, but never appeared at the trial to testify. 8 Plaintiff brought a
subsequent action against Dr. Hussain on contract and tort theo-
ries.89 The superior court affirmed the lower court's holding that Dr.
Hussain was liable to the plaintiff on both contract and tort
grounds."'
The Spaulding court recognized the enforceability of a treating
physician's affirmative agreement to testify. 91 In addition, the court
reasoned that a treating physician has an implied duty to "render
reasonably required litigation assistance to his patient." 9 The court,
however, declined to answer whether that assistance "unequivocally
and invariably requires the physician to testify in court."9 3 Rather,
the court suggested that a physician, who at the start of treatment
expressly refuses to testify for a patient, is not thereby relieved from
supplying other assistance, such as producing medical reports or con-
sulting with counsel. 9 ' A physician who does not make a disclaimer
is not, according to the court, necessarily left without any choice but
to testify. The Spaulding court would allow the physician to give
82. 229 N.J. Super. 430, 551 A.2d 1022 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1988).
83. Id. at 433, 551 A.2d at 1023.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 433, 551 A.2d at 1023-24.
87. Spaudling v. Hussain, 229 N.J. Super. 430, 433, 551 A.2d 1022, 1024 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1988).
88. Id.
89. Id. at 435, 551 A.2d at 1025-26.
90. Id. at 445, 551 A.2d at 1030.
91. Id. at 440, 551 A.2d at 1027.
92. Spaulding v. Hussain, 229 N.J. Super. 430, 440, 551 A.2d 1022, 1028 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1988).
93. Id.
94. Id. at 440-41, 551 A.2d at 1028.
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assistance by other means pursuant to the rules of civil procedure.9"
Spaulding follows the judicial views expressed in Alexander v.
Knight96 and Hammonds v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.97 At issue
in these cases was whether a treating physician breached the patient-
physician relationship by giving information' to the patient's litiga-
tion adversary. In answering affirmatively, both courts expressed the
opinion that physicians owe more than just medical care to their pa-
tients.98 There is a duty of total care that includes the duty to "offer
. . . medical testimony on behalf of [the] patient if the patient be-
comes involved in litigation over the injury or illness which the doc-
tor treated." 99
Although the Spaulding court did not outline the parameters of
the physician's duty to assist with litigation, it stressed that a physi-
cian must not disregard the "basic obligation" of providing at least a
"modicum" of assistance.100 The opinion clearly stated that, at the
very least, reasonably required litigation assistance includes medical
reports, deposition testimony, or consultation with patients'
attorneys.' 0 '
The Montana Supreme Court, when faced with a factually simi-
lar situation, rejected the Spaulding reasoning. In Knight v. John-
son, '2 the treating doctor was deposed and later informed by letter,
of the plaintiff's trial date.'0 3 The doctor failed to appear at the trial,
and plaintiff brought a negligence action against him.' 0" Citing
Spaulding, the plaintiff claimed that his doctor had a duty to appear
and testify at the trial. °5
The court refused to adopt the Spaulding position, reasoning
that a plaintiff's interest in compelled testimony is protected by the
subpoena process.'0 6 The court held that "no duty exists for a [treat-
ing] physician to testify at the trial of a patient, absent compulsory
95. Id. For instance, the physician could submit to a videotaped deposition pursuant to
N.J. CT. R. 4:14-9.
96. 25 Pa. D. & C.2d 649 (1961), afid, 197 Pa. Super. 79, 177 A.2d 142 (1962).
97. 243 F. Supp. 793 (N.D. Ohio 1965).
98. Hammonds v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 243 F. Supp. 793, 799 (1965); Alexander
v. Knight, 25 Pa. D & C.2d 649, 655, 177 A.2d 142, 146 (1961), affid, 197 Pa. Super. 79, 177
A.2d 142 (1962).
99. Hammonds, 243 F. Supp. at 799.
100. Spaulding v. Hussain, 229 N.J. Super. 430, 441, 551 A.2d 1022, 1028 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1988).
101. Id.
102. 237 Mont. 230, 773 P.2d 293 (1989).
103. Id. at -' 773 P.2d at 293.
104. Id. at -, 773 P.2d at 294.
105. Id.
106. Id. at -, 773 P.2d at 294.
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process."10 7
Since few cases discuss a physician's duty to render litigation
assistance, no clear rule has emerged. The majority of the existing
cases seem to favor imposing a common law duty on doctors to
render litigation assistance.
2. Interference With the Patient's Right to Full Compensation
for Injuries.-Every citizen has the right to sue.10 8 For every injury
there is a remedy, and damages are often the compensation that the
law will award. 10 9 When a treating physician refuses to render litiga-
tion assistance, that physician interferes with the patient's right to
receive full compensation for injuries sustained.
A physician's litigation assistance usually involves expert medi-
cal testimony. There is no general policy that requires expert testi-
mony to be a part of the evidence on subjects open to expert testi-
mony." There is an exception to this rule, however. When issues
require special experience, only a person with that special experience
is permitted to testify."' The increased complexity of medical care
has made medical issues less comprehensible to the average juror.
More lawyers have come to rely on the specialized knowledge of
medical experts to assist with explanations to the jury."12 Indeed,
many courts require expert medical testimony for proof of causation
and degree of disability."'
An expert witness is not a representative of a party to the litiga-
tion."1 4 Nonetheless, it is in the best interests of a plaintiff to receive
the support of an empathetic expert witness. The plaintiff's treating
physician is usually the best witness because of the physician's famil-
iarity with the chronology of the plaintiff's injury. A plaintiff's attor-
ney may be forced to retain an expert if the treating physician is
107. Knight v. Johnson, 237 Mont. 230, -, 773 P.2d 293, 295 (1989).
108. A cause of action is considered to be property protected by the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution. Logan v. Zimmerman Brush
Co., 455 U.S. 422 (1982) (employee's right to Fair Employment Practice Act's adjudicatory
procedures are property protected by the due process clause).
109. Scott v. Donald, 165 U.S. 58 (1897).
110. See 7 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2090 (1978).
111. Id. Another exception is that when an action is against a physician for malpractice,
evidence on that issue must contain expert testimony. Id.
112. M. KRAFT, USING EXPERTS IN CIVIL CASES 237 (2d ed. 1982).
113. See, e.g., Eno v. Watkins, 229 Neb. 855, 858, 429 N.W.2d 371, 373 (1988); Bar-
rett v. Coast Range Plywood, 294 Or. 641, 644, 661 P.2d 926, 929 (1983). See also Donaldson
v. Maffucci, 397 Pa. 548, 555, 156 A.2d 835, 838 (1959) (expert testimony is indispensable in
a medical malpractice case).
114. Franklin v. Milner, 139 N.J. Super. 385, 387, 354 A.2d 110, 111 (L. Div. 1976),
rev'd and modified on other grounds, 150 N.J. Super. 456, 375 A.2d 1244 (App. Div. 1977).
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uncooperative or hostile to the legal profession.11 5
Physicians who impose contracts that express a policy against
rendering litigation assistance' " clearly indicate that they are hostile
toward the legal profession. Plaintiffs can subpoena these doctors to
testify at trial or to give depositions, 17 but that is often an unwise
approach. Doctors may terminate medical treatment because of legal
compulsion to render litigation assistance. In addition, compelling
doctors to testify often assures that any litigation assistance received
will be antagonistic. Adverse testimony may jeopardize any potential
recovery for the plaintiff's injury.
Lawyers can and often do go outside the community to find an
acceptable medical expert witness. It is widely recognized that local
physicians will rarely testify against one another in medical malprac-
tice cases. No compelling reasons exist, however, to prevent a local
doctor from testifying in a personal injury case, or a meritorious
malpractice case. Doctors are paid for their time, and trial courts
readily make schedule adjustments to accommodate the needs of
physician witnesses. Doctors should not let animosity toward lawyers
interfere with their duty to render total patient care.
As previously noted, a physician's duty to give complete patient
care may include a duty to offer litigation assistance. " Doctors do
not necessarily have to testify in court. In fact, one state considers
the duty fulfilled if the doctor submits to a videotaped deposition. " 9
Other states should encourage doctors to cooperate with the legal
process. States could form groups of specially trained interviewers to
work within the court system. These interviewers would be responsi-
ble for deposing doctors and other witnesses who are hostile toward
lawyers. The interviewers may ask questions submitted by the par-
ties' attorneys, or may be permitted to raise questions of their own.
Communication with the lawyers would be limited to trial prepara-
tion and the actual trial. This approach serves to limit doctors' con-
tact with combative attorneys. Doctors might become more willing to
assist their patients in receiving compensation for injuries.
Not every patient intends to litigate; those that do bring suit
may have strong cases. A doctor's refusal to cooperate with the legal
process harms the patient and serves no useful purpose. Doctors can
115. See M. KRAFT, USING EXPERTS IN CIVIL CASES (2d ed. 1982).
116. See supra note 80.
117. See, e.g., FED. R. Ctv. P. 45(e)(1); PA. R. Civ. P. 234 (witnesses), 4018
(depositions).
I I. See supra notes 82-107 and accompanying text.
119. See N.J. CT. R. 4:14-9.
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release their anger over lawsuits in more constructive ways that are
less harmful to the patients they ultimately affect.
120
3. Antitrust Violations.-It is well established that health care
professionals are subject to the restrictions imposed by the Sherman
Antitrust Act12" ' and its state counterparts. 22 In the aftermath of the
United States Supreme Court's pronouncement that the "learned
professions" are not immune to antitrust claims,'23 an increasing
number of antitrust actions have been filed against health care pro-
fessionals and professional organizations under section 1 of the Sher-
man Act. Frequently, allegations raised against professionals involve
claims of illegal boycott activity.
2 4
An antitrust violation consists of a contract, combination, or
conspiracy that acts to unreasonably restrain trade and has an effect
upon interstate commerce. 125 The interstate commerce requirement
is met if a restraint occurs "in" or has a "substantial effect on" in-
terstate commerce. 12 Traditionally, professional activity was consid-
ered to be localized and would not satisfy these tests. After the Su-
preme Court's ruling in Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar,2 ' the
interstate commerce requirement could be fulfilled by a showing that
the local professional activity was an "integral" part of transactions
related to interstate commerce. 2 8 The requirement was further re-
laxed in McLain v. Real Estate Board of New Orleans, Inc.129 The
Supreme Court held that an effect on interstate commerce is estab-
lished when the local activity challenged is shown "'as a matter of
practical economics' to have a not insubstantial effect on the inter-
state commerce involved."' 30 In medical practice cases, the interstate
120. See infra notes 180-93 and accompanying text.
121. Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act provides: "Every contract, combination in
the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the
several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal." 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988).
122. State antitrust laws are usually patterned after the federal statute. See, e.g., TEX.
Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 15.05 (Vernon 1987 & Supp. 1990); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 10,
§ 1101 (1980 & Supp. 1989). Pennsylvania is the only state without its own antitrust laws.
123. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
124. See Gilmore, The Antitrust Implications of Boycotts by Health Professionals: Pro-
fessional Ethics and the First Amendment, 14 AM. J.U & MED. 221 (1988).
125. See supra note 121.
126. Burke v. Ford, 389 U.S. 320 (1967).
127. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
128. Id. at 784-85 (citing United States v. Frankfort Distilleries, 324 U.S. 293, 297
(1945)).
129. 444 U.S. 232 (1980).
130. Id. at 246 (quoting Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738, 745
(1976)). The impact that a defendant's professional activity has on interstate commerce is a
question of fact to be decided on a case-by-case basis. Williams v. St. Joseph Hosp., 629 F.2d
448, 454 (7th Cir. 1980).
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commerce nexus is demonstrated by such factors as patient origin,
purchase of medical supplies and pharmaceuticals from out-of-state
suppliers, and insurance payments made by out-of-state insurers (in-
cluding the federal government).1"'
Concerted activity exists when two or more persons contract,
combine, or conspire to promote conduct that unreasonably restrains
trade. A "group boycott" is a concerted refusal to deal and violates
antitrust laws.' 3 2 Conversely, a unilateral refusal to deal does not
violate the Sherman Act.'33
The definition of a boycott is not limited to situations in which
the target of the concerted refusal to deal is another competitor. A
boycott of patients may constitute a refusal to deal in violation of the
Sherman Act. In Williams v. St. Joseph Hospital,13  a class action
was filed on behalf of all persons who had filed or had the potential
to file a malpractice suit against any doctor in a certain town. 35 All
the doctors were allegedly engaged in a conspiracy to refuse to treat
any person or family member of any person who had initiated a mal-
practice suit against any doctor in the area. 36 On defendants' mo-
tion for summary dismissal, the district court entered judgment for
the defendants. 37 The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit re-
versed and remanded, holding that the plaintiffs had sufficiently es-
tablished a cause of action under the antitrust laws.' 38 The court
reasoned that the professional boycott interfered with the free mar-
ket for the purchase of medical services and also restricted the free-
dom of doctors to provide services.13 The remaining question on re-
mand was whether such restrictions had the requisite impact upon
interstate commerce. 40
Physicians who require their patients to agree to terms of treat-
ment such as those set forth by Cumberland Orthopaedic Associ-
ates 4 might be violating antitrust laws. These contracts, in effect,
cause a boycott of medical consumers who are also litigants. The
questions raised are whether this type of boycott (1) is the result of a
131. See Feminist Women's Health Center v. Mohammed, 586 F.2d 530, 539 (5th Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 924 (1979).
132. Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. I, 5 (1958).
133. United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919).
134. 629 F.2d 448 (7th Cir. 1980).
135. Id. at 450.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 448.
138. Id. at 453-54.
139. Williams v. St. Joseph Hosp., 629 F.2d 448, 453 (7th Cir. 1980).
140. Id. at 454. There is no published decision of the case on remand.
141. See Cumberland Orthopaedic Assocs., Ltd., supra note 80.
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conspiracy or combination of physicians; and (2) is an unreasonable
restraint on trade that has a "not insubstantial" effect on interstate
commerce.
(a) Conspiracy or combination.-The existence of a conspiracy
or combination, more often than not, must be inferred from circum-
stantial evidence. Any evidence may be employed if it indicates that
the defendants entered into an agreement to take joint action. 2 Cir-
cumstantial proof of conspiratorial action may include meetings at-
tended by the defendants at which they had a chance to conspire,
followed shortly thereafter by parallel behavior.' 3 On the other
hand, it is not concerted action for a defendant to set terms and
conditions of service and then to act upon this unilateral announce-
ment, even though it is logical to expect others to follow suit. " "
In a "boycott of patients" case, plaintiff-patients must prove
that the doctors reached an express agreement to refuse to deal, or
must show the same result through circumstantial evidence.
45 Physi-
cians in group practice, all the physicians in town, or entire physi-
cian organizations may be found to have conspired against litigious
patients. A contract that denies litigation assistance may be the vehi-
cle used to carry out the conspiracy. However, if one physician, frus-
trated by the rise in malpractice insurance costs, decides to avoid
litigious patients, it is not concerted action when other doctors like
the idea and conform to it.'
4 6
(b) Unreasonable restraint on trade.-An unreasonable restraint
on trade is determined through application of either the per se rule
or the "rule of reason" analysis.' 47 Traditionally, group boycotts are
illegal per se.14 1 A plaintiff must prove only that a boycott exists; the
142. Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 764 (1984) ("[E]vidence
[to show a conspiracy must] reasonably tend . . . to prove that the [defendants] . . . 'had a
conscious commitment to a common. scheme designed to achieve an unlawful objective'"
(quoting Edward J. Sweeney & Sons v. Texaco, 637 F.2d 105, 111 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. de-
nied, 451 U.S. 911 (1981))).
143. Id. at 765-66.
144. Id. at 762-63.
145. See supra notes 121, 142 and accompanying text.
146. In 1986, obstetricians, neurologists, and orthopedic surgeons in Boston and Florida
stopped accepting patients in protest of malpractice insurance rate increases. There were ques-
tions about antitrust violations, but no actual prosecutions were initiated. The doctors insisted
that each practitioner acted individually. See Doctors Deny Antitrust Allegations, U.P.I. Feb.
12, 1989 (Lexis, Nexis library, Omni file); Doctors Withhold Services in Protest on Insurance,
N.Y. Times, Dec. 10, 1986, at A25, col. I (city ed.).
147. See W. HOLMES, 1988 ANTITRUST LAW HANDBOOK § 1.04.
148. Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. I, 5 (1958); Klor's, Inc. v.
Broadway-Hale Stores, 359 U.S. 207, 212 (1959).
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court may then presume that the defendant intended to illegally re-
strain trade." 9
In cases involving group boycotts by physicians, courts often
choose to apply the more flexible rule of reason standard. 50 The rule
of reason allows courts to permit certain boycotts when they are not
primarily motivated by anticompetitive outcomes. 15 If, for example,
an alleged restraint of trade is founded upon a public service ration-
ale or a professional ethical norm, rule of reason analysis is em-
ployed. 5 ' In antitrust cases, courts generally examine the purpose
behind a specific agreement, the market power of the parties, the
existence of a less restrictive alternative, and the agreement's
procompetitive and anticompetitive effects. 53
Additionally, in medical practice cases, defendants are granted
a legal excuse for anticompetitive behavior. This excuse is termed
the "patient care defense.' 5' The patient care defense is applied
only in cases involving disputes over scientific methods. 155 Most
courts seem to believe that the rule of reason gives sufficient force to
public service rationales and that the patient care defense is not
necessary.156
The Cumberland Orthopaedic and Neurological Surgery physi-
cians explicitly state in their patient consent forms that they are con-
149. Northern Pac. Ry., 356 U.S. at 5.
150. These cases address primarily the antitrust effects of professional ethical canons
and public service policy statements. See, e.g., Weiss v. York Hosp., 745 F.2d 786 (3d Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1060 (1985); Wilk v. AMA, 719 F.2d 207 (7th Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 467 U.S. 1210 (1984). See also Gilmore, supra, note 124. The same basic antitrust
rules, however, apply to the boycott-of-patients cases. See, e.g., Williams v. St. Joseph Hosp.,
629 F.2d 448 (7th Cir. 1980).
151. W. HOLMES, 1988 ANTITRUST LAW HANDBOOK § 1.09[l].
152. See National Soc'y of Prof. Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978) (profes-
sional organization promulgated ethical canons proscribing competitive bidding among its
membership to minimize the risk that competition would produce inferior engineering work,
endangering the public safety); Wilk, 719 F.2d at 207 (AMA took measures to persuade tradi-
tional health care providers that cooperation or association with chiropractors would be
unethical).
153. See generally 7 P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAW, 1500-11 (1978 & Supp. 1989).
The rule of reason requires plaintiffs to show actual harm to competition. National Soc'y of
Prof. Eng'rs, 435 U.S. at 691. Defendants are allowed to present countervailing procompetitive
aspects of their boycott. Id.
154. Wilk, 719 F.2d at 228-29. The patient care defense is satisfied if: (I) the defendant
genuinely entertained a concern for the care of patients; (2) that concern was objectively rea-
sonable; (3) concern for patients was the dominant motivating factor for the defendant's ac-
tions; and (4) the concern for patients could not have been satisfied in a manner less restrictive
of competition. Id. at 227.
155. See FTC v. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986); Koefoot v. American
College of Surgeons, 652 F. Supp. 882 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (Supp. Memo. Opinion & Order
1987).
156. See Gilmore, supra note 124, at 234-38.
PHYSICIAN RETALIATION
cerned with providing quality care for their patients. 57 Patient care,
however, does not seem to be the primary motive behind their con-
tracts. Rather, the contracts appear to function solely for the doc-
tors' convenience. The contracts have undertones of disdain for per-
sons who try to seek compensation for their injuries. They effectively
discourage requests for treatment from patients who may want to
litigate a perfectly legitimate claim. If challenged in court, these
contracts and the resulting restraint of trade would probably be
tested under the per se rule.
With these contracts in effect, patients who need litigation assis-
tance are limited to choosing physicians who will provide this service
in addition to medical treatment. Some patients may be denied any
choice at all." 8' If the physicians truly place patient care first, they
would agree to provide litigation assistance as part of the total pack-
age of care.
(c) Effect on interstate commerce.-The amount of interstate
commerce affected by a defendant's activity is a fundamental consid-
eration when the concerted activity challenged is technically intra-
state in character. The "substantial effects" test requires that the
amount of interstate commerce affected must be more than de
minimis,'59 but need not be enormous. 6 ° Private physicians' antiliti-
gation contracts, which essentially bar litigious patients from treat-
ment, may have a substantial effect on interstate commerce. Factors
to consider in such an analysis would be: the number of doctors
utilizing the contracts, the number of patients actually denied treat-
ment, and the corresponding effect upon the physicians' interstate
purchases and business with out-of-state patients.
Antitrust regulation clearly reaches physician boycott activity.
Nevertheless, antitrust litigation will probably not provide litigant-
patients with greater access to medical care. Other regulations are
more likely to succeed.''
4. Unconscionability of Contract.-A variety of health care
157. See supra note 80.
158. Research for this Comment did not reveal whether other physician groups in Har-
risburg, Pa., or physicians elsewhere in the nation, are employing similar contracts. It appears
that the various national medical organizations frown upon such contracts. See infra note 174.
159. McLain v. Real Estate Bd. of New Orleans, Inc., 444 U.S. 232, 246 (1980).
160. Feminist Women's Health Ctr. v. Mohammed, 586 F.2d 530, 541 (5th Cir. 1978)
(cessation of abortion clinic's out-of-state purchases and out-of-state business totaling $16,000
would amount to a substantial impact on interstate commerce).
161. See infra notes 189-226 and accompanying text.
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contracts have been examined under the judicial microscope. For ex-
ample, some contracts purport to limit the health care provider's tort
liability.16 2 Courts have traditionally refused to enforce these excul-
patory provisions within health care contracts, holding them to be
against public policy. 6 ' Courts are more apt to enforce contracts
calling for fairer alternative methods of resolving malpractice claims,
such as arbitration.16 These contracts do not bear the stigma of a
public policy violation because they still provide patients with an op-
portunity to seek compensation for injury.
165
A number of commentators support the use of contract, rather
than tort, as the source of a patient's entitlement to both medical
treatment and legal assistance in a malpractice suit. 66 Arbitration
clauses, for example, are designed to modify patients' tort rights so
as to protect physicians from harsh malpractice liability verdicts." 7
Contract provisions that attempt to waive a physician's duty to offer
litigation assistance have little to do with shielding physicians from
medical malpractice lawsuits. Rather, these "antilitigation" con-
tracts resemble the unconscionable exculpatory clauses.
The unconscionability of a contract rests upon the disparity of
the parties' bargaining power and the use of standardized contracts
of adhesion.' 68 In cases of adhesion contracts, one party has superior
bargaining power and often offers the contract on a "take it or leave
it" basis. 69 The weaker party does not have an opportunity to nego-
162. See Ginsburg, Kahn, Thornhill & Gambardella, Contractual Revisions to Medical
Malpractice Liability, 49 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 253 (1986).
163. The seminal case holding an exculpatory clause in a medical care contract to be
invalid is Tunkl v. Regents of Univ. Calif., 60 Cal. 2d 92, 383 P.2d 441, 32 Cal. Rptr. 33
(1963). See also Emory Univ. v. Porubiansky, 248 Ga. 391, 282 S.E.2d 903 (1981) (public
policy will not allow a physician to contractually release himself from the legal and ethical
duty to exercise reasonable care).
164. See generally Annotation, Arbitration of Medical Malpractice Claims, 84 A.L.R.
3D 375 (1978).
165. Over two-thirds of the states have general statutes that authorize agreements to
arbitrate. A minority of states have statutes that specifically authorize arbitration agreements
relating to medical malpractice claims. See generally Henderson, Agreements Changing the
Forum for Resolving Malpractice Claims, 49 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs. 243 (1986). The va-
lidity of arbitration agreements depends upon the contract principles regarding fair dealing.
See Obstetrics & Gynecologists v. Pepper, 101 Nev. 105, 693 P.2d 1259 (1985) (clinic offered
arbitration agreement on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, resulting in finding of an adhesion con-
tract, which was held unenforceable in absence of evidence of plaintiff's knowing assent).
166. See Symposium: Medical Malpractice: Can the Private Sector Find Relief?, 49
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (1986). The symposium articles outline the views for and against
the use of contracts in medical care.
167. Ginsburg, Kahn, Thornhill & Gambardella, supra note 162, at 253-55.
168. See Tunkl v. Regents of Univ. Calif., 60 Cal. 2d 92, 383 P.2d 441, 32 Cal. Rptr.
33 (1963).
169. Madden v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 17 Cal. 3d 699, 711, 552 P.2d 1178, 1185, 131
Cal. Rptr. 882, 889 (1976); Morris v. Metriyakool, 418 Mich. 423, 440, 344 N.W.2d 736, 742
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tiate and may not have the freedom to look elsewhere for a more
favorable contract.
1 70
The general rule that parties to a contract are bound by its
terms becomes ineffective when the contract is one of adhesion,
although there is an exception to this exception. 7 2 Contracts that
purport to disclaim a private physician's duty to render reasonable
litigation assistance may qualify as adhesion contracts because: (1)
they are offered on a take it or leave it basis; (2) individual patients
are not given an opportunity to negotiate for more favorable terms;
(3) with the exception of metropolitan areas, patients do not have
the opportunity to look elsewhere for a more favorable contract;17
and (4) these contracts serve to limit the obligations of physicians. If
challenged, the validity of antilitigation contracts would depend upon
the circumstances surrounding the agreement. Physicians must print
the contracts on a separate sheet of paper and must be sure they are
legible. Physicians should read over the contract with the patient and
answer all questions before the patient signs it.
If courts enforce antilitigation contracts, patients may suffer a
double loss: termination from treatment if the patient insists upon
soliciting the physician's litigation assistance, and the possibility of
an insufficient damage award as a result of no litigation assistance.
Neither result can be said to fulfill the reasonable expectations of the
patient entering a medical treatment contract.
5. Violations of Medical Ethics Codes.-Doctors have, in va-
rious medical ethics codes, pledged a duty to cooperate with the legal
profession for the welfare of their patients.1 7 " Ethics codes are not
(1984).
170. Madden, 17 Cal. 3d at 711, 552 P.2d at 1185-86, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 889-90.
171. Id. at 711, 552 P.2d at 1185, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 889.
172. Courts will enforce provisions in adhesion contracts that limit the duties or liabili-
ties of the stronger party when the limiting clause is "conspicuous, plain, and clear and [does]
not operate to defeat the reasonable expectations of the parties." Id. (quoting Steven v. Fidel-
ity & Casualty Co., 58 Cal. 2d 862, 377 P.2d 284, 27 Cal. Rptr. 569 (1962)).
173. Some patients may have to travel up to 100 miles to find a suitable doctor. See
Delivery Practice Faltering, supra note 39, at 37.
174. Some examples of these ethical code provisions are:
Ill. A physician shall respect the law and also recognize a responsibility to
seek changes in those requirements which are contrary to the best interests of
the patient.
IV. A physician shall respect the rights of patients, of colleagues, and of
other health professionals, and shall safeguard patient confidences within the
constraints of the law.
AMA PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETHICS, Principles III, IV (1980).
The neurological surgeon shall cooperate with members of the legal profes-
sion in order that justice with mercy and compassion shall prevail.
AMERICAN Assoc. OF NEUROLOGICAL SURGEONS, CODE OF ETHICS § V C.
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laws, but rather are "standards of conduct which define the essen-
tials of honorable behavior for the physician."17" Nevertheless, policy
statements regarding standards of care have occasionally been
treated as evidence of a legal standard of care or practice.'7" An'
ethics code promulgated by an influential organization, such as the
American Medical Association, could be offered in court as repre-
sentative of a legal standard of practice. Contracts that waive litiga-
tion assistance should be held to violate that legal standard.
IV. Regulating the Physician-Patient Relationship: Everyone's
Responsibility
Medical practice is subject to heavy regulation. Almost every
aspect of the system is controlled by federal, state, and local govern-
ment rules. Practitioners are also subject to self-regulation.'
One aspect of private medical practice that has remained essen-
tially free from regulation is the physician's right to choose whom to
treat.'78 Some health care commentators would eliminate this right
in favor of a public utility approach to health care regulation in or-
der to assure access to health care for everyone.' 9 The public utility
approach is problematic, however, because it may harm patients
rather than help them.
Unlike public utilities, medical treatment consists of a complex
array of specialized services. Medical practice requires a high level
Personal Conduct
The physician-patient relationship is the central focus for all ethical con-
cerns. The orthopaedic surgeon is expected to provide competent and compas-
sionate care . . . and maintain the patient's best interests as paramount in all
professional conduct.
The orthopaedic surgeon should observe all laws, uphold the dignity and
honor of the profession, and accept its self-imposed discipline.
AMERICAN ACADEMY OF ORTHOPAEDIC SURGEONS, CODE OF ETHICS, Personal Conduct
(1988).
175. AMA, PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETHICS Preamble (1980).
176. See Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hosp., 33 II1. 2d 326, 211 N.E.2d
253 (1965) (hospital regulations, standards, and bylaws provide evidence of a custom of care).
177. The statutory medical licensing schemes of the states provide the mechanisms for
self-regulation by the medical profession. Professional organizations and their ethics codes and
principles are another source of physician regulation. See AMA. PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL
ETHICS (1980).
178. Doctors vigorously exercise the right to turn patients away. See supra notes 21-64.
Recently, physicians have also refused to treat AIDS patients. The AIDS epidemic prompted
the AMA to release a policy statement about the duty to treat persons with AIDS: "A physi-
cian may not ethically refuse to treat a patient whose condition is within the physician's cur-
rent realm of competence solely because the patient is seropositive [for AIDS]." AMA Council
on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, Ethical Issues Involved in the Growing AIDS Crisis, 259 J.
A.M.A. 1360, 1360 (1988).
179. See, e.g., D. RUTSTEIN, BLUEPRINT FOR MEDICAL CARE (1974).
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of competency, which private competition tends to foster. A national
health care program would eliminate the fee-for-service system, in
turn eliminating freedom of choice and competition. Eliminating
competition has the potential to reduce physician competency.
Physicians should not lose the right to choose whom to serve. At
the same time, doctors must not continue to arbitrarily deny medical
services to persons who are associated with a lawsuit. Clearly, the
underlying problem concerns the resentment, hurt, and humiliation
doctors feel about medical malpractice suits. These feelings are per-
vasive, whether or not a doctor has actually been sued, because every
doctor is affected by the increase in malpractice insurance costs that
is often attributed to malpractice lawsuits.
The medical profession has every right to be worried about mal-
practice lawsuits. It is unethical, however, for doctors to take out
their personal anger on innocent patients. In order to protect the
doctor-patient relationship, society must go to the core of the prob-
lem. Physicians, lawyers, states, and consumers can, and should,
work together toward finding solutions to this common problem.
A. Physicians
Many physicians file countersuits in response to being sued for
malpractice. 180 When it became clear that countersuits were largely
unsuccessful, physicians turned to other retaliatory devices. The an-
tilitigation contract discussed in this Comment is one such device.
Physicians who impose antilitigation contracts on their patients
must remember that not every lawsuit is frivolous. Errors in the
treatment of patients do occur, some of them with severe conse-
quences. Physicians may try to avoid litigation and litigious patients.
Avoidance is legally permissible, but ethically inexcusable. If these
patients are continually rejected, eventually the law will protect
them.
Instead, doctors must increase interprofessional communication
with lawyers. Some commentators suggest that the greatest source of
conflict between doctors and lawyers is the difference in the way the
two professions reason and solve problems. 8" To help resolve the
conflict, state and local bar and medical associations have estab-
180. The legal theories of countersuits include negligence, abuse of process, and mali-
cious prosecution. See Friedman v. Dozorc, 412 Mich. 1, 312 N.W.2d 585 (1981) (a compre-
hensive opinion on the validity of countersuits).
181. See Gibson & Schwartz, Physicians and Lawyers: Science, Art, and Conflict, 6
AM. JL. & MED. 173 (1981).
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lished interdisciplinary committees. 8 ' The purpose of these commit-
tees is to foster understanding and cooperation among the profes-
sions in order to better serve clients and patients.'8 3 Some of these
associations have set forth guidelines for interprofessional relation-
ships, 84 which would be instructive to newly organized associations.
Once an interprofessional association is established, the associa-
tion should organize continuing education seminars.8 5 These semi-
nars could be offered monthly to present current events affecting
both professions. Attendance at the seminars should be a mandatory
requirement for membership in each professional organization.
To reach the goal of placing the patient's interest and welfare
first, physicians must strive to better communicate with their pa-
tients. Fortunately, medical schools are teaching their students to
place more emphasis on the doctor-patient relationship. 8 '
Practicing physicians can improve communication with their pa-
tients by better understanding patient attitudes toward doctors.
Studies indicate that patients rely upon certain misconceptions about
medical malpractice. 87 Doctors, too, have misconceptions about pa-
182. See, e.g., infra notes 193-95 and accompanying text.
183. Guidelines on Attorney and Physician Relationships, 73 ILL. B.J. 486-88 (1985)
(introductory letter to members).
184. See, e.g., Guidelines on Attorney and Physician Relationships, 73 ILL. B.J. 486-88
(1985). The Illinois Bar Association and Illinois Medical Society recognize that the duty of a
physician includes rendering litigation assistance.
The Kentucky interprofessional association also asserts that a physician has an ethical
obligation to give depositions, written medical reports, and testimony on behalf of his patient.
See Interprofessional Code-Kentucky Medical Association and Kentucky Bar Association,
87 J. Ky. MED. Assoc. 39-44 (1989). Both codes are comprehensive and should be considered
by professional organizations currently without interprofessional standards.
185. Ohio doctors and lawyers established a two-part educational program. First, doc-
tors give lawyers a course in functional anatomy. Then, the lawyers teach a basic course cover-
ing the mechanics of personal injury and medical malpractice lawsuits. See Appelson, Doctors
and Lawyers Learning to Live Together, B. LEADER, May-June 1982, at 23.
186. The School of Medicine at the University of Missouri at Kansas City and Harvard
Medical School have both incorporated humanistic courses into their curricula. See Gibbs,
supra note I, at 53.
187. These myths are:
There is a great deal of malpractice in today's health care system.
In fact, most clinicians provide services [that are] . . . above acceptable
standards in their respective fields.
Negligence is found in most malpractice claims.
In fact, the majority of malpractice claims are resolved in favor of [the
defendant] . ...
Most patients ... sue because they have evidence that the doctor was
negligent.
[In fact,] [mlost malpractice insurance companies conclude that anger and
surprise by patients over unanticipated clinical outcomes trigger a large percent-
age of malpractice lawsuits.
Most malpractice suits are linked to incompetent physicians.
[In fact,] the majority of . . . claims are made against qualified [physi-
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tient motivations for bringing malpractice suits.188 Most misconcep-
tions can be eliminated through education. In addition to giving indi-
vidual patients a thorough explanation of procedures and risks,'8 9
physicians should provide consumer education seminars about their
specialties to the community. Doctors should also prepare public ser-
vice announcements for local television and radio stations that en-
courage patients to ask questions of their doctors. A small amount of
time donated by doctors to educate their patients will go a long way
toward preventing future lawsuits and will help restore patient trust
in the medical profession.
In addition to improving physician-lawyer and physician-patient
relationships, doctors should continue to seek relief from insurance
cost increases. Physicians might be more willing to offer assistance to
litigant-patients if medical malpractice insurance premiums de-
crease. Although everyone would benefit from an abatement, only
doctors seem to aggressively seek solutions. 9 '
Insurance rates have, in fact, dropped for the first time in over a
decade. 1" In 1989, some medical malpractice insurers either de-
creased their malpractice insurance premiums or continued the pre-
miums at flat rates. 92 Insurers attribute the rate abatement to a
drop in the number of claims filed and a decrease in extraordinarily
high jury awards.' 93 If this is a harbinger of things to come, doctors
cians] . . . who receive [outstanding] peer review reports.
Nelson, Heed Consumers On Malpractice To Avoid Suits, Hosps., Sept. 20, 1987, at 64.
188. Doctors believe that money is the motivating factor for bringing a malpractice suit.
Id. The current opinion among observers is that plaintiffs sue because they are angry at physi-
cians for not communicating. Patients may also sue because they have been treated with indif-
ference, lack of sincerity, or disrespect. Id. See also Gibbs, supra note 1, at 52 (statement of
consumer advocate Michael Rooney) ("It's when [the patients] feel they've been hurt or be-
trayed that they sue.").
189. This explanation is more commonly known as informed consent. See generally Mei-
sel & Kabnick, Informed Consent to Medical Treatment: An Analysis of Recent Legislation,
41 U. PITT. L. REV. 407 (1980); Meisel & Roth, Toward An Informed Discussion of Informed
Consent: A Review and Critique of the Empirical Studies, 25 ARIz. L. REV. 265 (1983); J.
KATZ, THE SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT (1984).
190. Some proposals thinly disguise doctors' contempt for lawyers. On January 13,
1988, the AMA announced a proposal to change the way malpractice claims are resolved. See
Holthaus, Take Malpractice Cases Out of the Courts: AMA, Hosps., Feb. 5, 1988, at 58. The
plan would replace the present jury system with an administrative system run by state medical
boards or new state agencies. Id. Lawyers' roles would be minimal or nonexistent. Doctors
claim that the plan would reduce the practice of defensive medicine and would keep doctors
from limiting their practices. Id. The problem with this proposal is that it places the resolution
of claims process in the control of doctors instead of lawyers without any safeguards for
consumers.
Physicians are also trying to eliminate incompetent colleagues. Physician-owned insurance
companies have successfully exposed negligent doctors. See supra note 47.
191. See Gastel, supra note 3.
192. See id.
193. See id.
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may cease restricting their practices.
A final suggestion to help doctors improve the physician-patient
relationship focuses upon ethical conduct. Professional medical orga-
nizations should consider putting more force behind their ethical
codes. There is an inherent conflict between individual professionals
and the requests from prominent medical organizations that physi-
cians live up to their ethical obligations. Organizations might enforce
their standards by requiring compliance with them, rather than
merely requesting compliance. Physicians who fail to uphold the
standards should be sanctioned. Sanctions can include a publication
of violations, a report to state medical boards, and a report to hospi-
tal peer review boards. These sanctions would apply to doctors who
employ antilitigation contracts because the contracts allow doctors to
breach their ethical duty to cooperate with the legal process194 on
behalf of their patients.
B. Lawyers
Lawyers, too, can help ameliorate the tension in doctor-patient
relations. Although doctors struggle to contain malpractice insurance
costs, lawyers question whether a liability crisis ever existed.195 Law-
yers cannot ignore the fact that high insurance premiums are affect-
ing medical practice to the detriment of society. Furthermore, law-
yers cannot ignore the fact that doctors blame lawyers for the
crisis. 196 Whether responsible or not, lawyers must work with doctors
to resolve the problem. Both professions must approach the matter
with their patient-clients' interests in mind.1 97
Lawyers may believe that they can best serve their clients by
helping them challenge physician conduct that interferes with tradi-
tional patient rights. Antilitigation contracts may violate patient
rights in a number of ways. 98 Lawyers could decide to engage in
litigation with doctors who enforce such contracts. Attorneys should
not, however, be hasty to initiate such suits. One successful antitrust
suit benefits one class of patients, but could harm patients as a
whole. If doctors are forced to treat all patients, there is a possibility
194. See supra note 174.
195. See Saks, supra note 71, at 77-79. See also Reske, Was There a Liability Crisis?,
A.B.A. J., Jan. 1989, at 46 (report about antitrust suits filed against four insurance companies
charging conspiracy to limit availability of commercial insurance and to cut other costs, such
as legal expenses to defend against claims).
196. See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text.
197. Lawyers should also recognize that their own health interests are at stake.
198. See supra notes 82-173 and accompanying text.
PHYSICIAN RETALIATION
that treatment will be mediocre at best. If doctors are forced to
render litigation assistance, in all likelihood the assistance will be
ineffective. Since some malpractice insurance rates are dropping,199
doctors may become more relaxed with lawyers and litigants. For the
time being, attorneys should defer initiating such lawsuits.
Instead, lawyers should join doctors in establishing interprofes-
sional committees to improve professional relations. Both professions
help society in a fiduciary capacity by working to serve the public.
Society is best served when the two professions interact amicably.
It is often said that lawyers are held to the same level of esteem
as used-car salesmen. Perhaps this view has evolved because attorney
advertisements sound much like used car advertisements. 00 Through
their advertisements, many plaintiffs' attorneys perpetuate the litig-
ious attitude that doctors and others loathe. Instead, attorneys and
clients should first explore possible alternatives to the litigation pro-
cess.2 0 1 Lawyers could also attempt to dispel the belief that a lawsuit
is the only way to receive compensation for injury by presenting
community education seminars in all areas of the law. With respect
to medical malpractice, lawyers could explain available alternatives
to suing and how the alternatives compare to the legal process.
Finally, attorneys can establish amiable relations with doctors
by allowing only experienced or specially trained lawyers to litigate
medical malpractice cases. These attorneys would have extensive
knowledge about medical practice and about the particular injury
involved in the suit. At the same time, attorneys must accept the
responsibility of weeding out incompetent and unethical
colleagues. 202
C. States
States have a special interest in regulating health care. Protec-
tion of public health is one of the duties devolving on states in the
exercise of their inherent police powers.2 03 To protect their citizens,
states impose many restrictions on the way physicians practice
199. See infra notes 202-04 and accompanying text.
200. Lawyer advertising is controlled by rules of professional conduct. See MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 7.1 (1987); MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CON-
DUCT Rule 7.2 (1990); MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-101 (1981).
201. See supra notes 164-66.
202. A lawyer's ethical duty to expose incompetent colleagues is governed by rules of
professional conduct. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.3 (1987); MODEL
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-103 (1981).
203. Dent v. West Va., 129 U.S. 114 (1889).
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medicine. 04 These restrictions are generally called malpractice laws.
In the 1970s, states responded to the malpractice insurance cri-
sis with legislative reforms of malpractice law.205 At that time, phy-
sicians were concerned about the availability and affordability of
medical liability insurance.20 6 The reforms helped, but in the early
1980s, a new crisis arose. States responded again with new legisla-
tive reforms.2 7
Now, states are faced with a crisis surrounding doctor-patient-
lawyer relationships. 8 States should not try to control a physician's
freedom of patient choice, but state legislatures and courts should
implement new reforms to malpractice law. These additional reforms
may help to reduce the number of malpractice suits initiated and the
number of high jury awards received. In turn, doctors may become
less angry and more willing to communicate with patients on a con-
genial basis.
First, state courts should authorize the board of bar examiners
to issue a license for medical malpractice specialization. Only law-.
yers with a license to specialize in malpractice cases may try them.
Second, all states should follow those states that have adopted rules
similar to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. These
204. States regulate physicians through statutory and common law. An enumeration of
the myriad state statutes controlling physician conduct is beyond the scope of this Comment.
For a summary of state statutes focusing on grounds for physician discipline, see Statutes on
Medical Disciplinary Boards, 14 STATE HEALTH LEGIS. REP. 14 (Aug. 1986).
State medical boards are also subject to some federal controls. In early 1990, a National
Practitioner Data Bank will begin operation. The data bank is authorized under the Health
Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. §§ 11101-37 (Supp. V 1987). See Gastel,
supra note 3. The data bank will maintain information on physicians and other health care
providers that have been convicted of medical malpractice, or that have been disciplined by
state boards, peer review committees, or professional societies. Id. Malpractice payments aris-
ing from claims and license revocation, suspension, or other disciplinary action must be re-
ported to the data bank within 30 days. Id. Disciplinary actions by hospitals or professional
societies must be reported in 15 days. Id. Hospitals must request information from the data
bank on physicians that are applying for staff privileges, and every two years must request
information on those physicians with privileges. Id. The goal of the data bank is to track
physicians who have practiced negligently in one state and then moved to another state to
practice. Id.
205. See generally Posner, Trends in Medical Malpractice Insurance, 1970-1985, 49
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 37 (Spring 1986).
206. Id.
207. Every state except West Virginia has passed tort reform legislation. For an evalua-
tion of the success or failure of each reform measure, see P. DANZON, THE EFFECTS OF TORT
REFORM ON THE FREQUENCY AND SEVERITY OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CLAIMS: A SUMMARY
OF RESEARCH RESULTS (1986).
Much of tort reform has been gutted by constitutional challenges and further judicial
expansion of liability by the courts. For example, courts in seven states (Idaho, Illinois, New
Hampshire, North Dakota, Ohio, Texas, and Washington) hold that statutory limits on
noneconomic damages are unconstitutional. See Gastel, supra note 3.
208. See generally Gibbs, supra note 1.
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rules allow an award of costs against attorneys who file frivolous
malpractice actions. 0 9 Third, states should test the merit of mal-
practice suits through pretrial screening panels.2 10 The effects of
screening panels vary from state to state.211 Those states with inef-
fective programs should work to revise them.
In addition, states should adopt a Spaulding approach2 12 to cre-
ate a common law duty requiring physicians to render litigation as-
sistance on behalf of patients. Alternatively, states should codify the
recognized duty to render litigation assistance. 1 3 Codification of the
duty does not interfere with a doctor's right to choose his patients; it
simply states positive law enforcing a doctor's ethical duty to provide
total patient care.
To protect health care consumers, state medical boards should
enforce professional ethics codes. Some states include disciplinary
measures in their medical licensing statutes for violations of medical
ethics codes. For example, Ohio considers that a violation of any pro-
vision of a national code of medical ethics is grounds for revocation,
suspension, or refusal to grant a medical license.214 Most national
medical ethics codes request that doctors cooperate with the legal
process.2 1 5 Doctors may be deterred from refusing to participate in
the legal process if they know that patients or lawyers could report
an incident of refusal to the state medical board and that the board
will take disciplinary action.
209. See, e.g., N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. 8303-a (McKinney Supp. 1990).
210. Pretrial screening panels typically consist of a practicing or retired judge, a physi-
cian, and a lawyer. See, e.g., N.Y. JUD. LAW § 148-a (McKinney 1983 & Supp. 1990). The
panel conducts hearings on malpractice cases and issues recommendations with regard to lia-
bility. See id. If a cause of action proves to be valid, screening panels have the authority to try
to resolve the dispute. Id. Otherwise, a panel recommendation is submitted as evidence in any
subsequent trial. Id. See also Gionne v. Abrams, 793 F.2d 74, 78 (2d Cir. 1986) (court, apply-
ing the New York statute, held that panel's recommendation is to be submitted to the jury like
any other expert opinion). Most screening panel legislation has endured constitutional chal-
lenges. See, e.g., Colton v. Riccobono, 67 N.Y.2d 571, 496 N.E.2d 670, 505 N.Y.S.2d 581
(1986); McLean v. Hunter, 486 So. 2d 816 (La. App.), revd on other grounds, 495 So. 2d
1298 (La. 1986); Perna v. Pirozzi, 92 N.J. 446, 457 A.2d 431 (1983). But see Aldana v.
Holub, 381 So. 2d 231 (Fla. 1980) (the actual effect and operation of the statute rendered it
unconstitutional).
211. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: No AGREEMENT ON
THE PROBLEMS OR SOLUTIONS 135-36 (1986).
212. See supra notes 87-106 and accompanying text.
213. See supra notes 86-114 and accompanying text.
214. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4731.22(B)(14) (Baldwin 1988). See also PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 63, § 422.4 (Purdon Supp. 1989); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 58-12-35, 58-12-36 (1986 & Supp.
1989); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 54.1-2914, 54.1-2915 (1988 & Supp. 1989) (statutes with provi-
sions similar to Ohio's).
215. See supra note 174.
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D. Consumers
Consumers have an obvious interest in improving physician-pa-
tient relationships. A consumer's contribution to improving the rela-
tionship involves, of course, education. Although the legal duty to
inform is imposed on doctors, consumers have a personal responsibil-
ity to become informed about issues that affect their health and well-
being.
Consumers can stay apprised of issues by forming grass roots
organizations. Doctors, lawyers, judges, and state representatives
should be invited to organization meetings to speak individually
about medical malpractice and proposed solutions to the problem. In
addition, communities should hold roundtable discussions. The pur-
pose of a roundtable would be to allow all interested parties to air
their views about medical malpractice and the doctor-patient rela-
tionship. Consumers and professionals can then form a task force to
work on the relationships at the community level. 16 At all times,
consumers should ask questions of anyone who has the power to af-
fect public health and well-being.
V. Conclusion
The traditional physician-patient relationship is no longer one of
trust and confidence. The specter of a potential lawsuit has caused
doctors to become more cautious and suspicious of patient motives.
Doctors have distanced themselves from patients, and patients, in
turn, have become more distrustful of doctors. This vicious cycle cre-
ates only more conflict between doctors and patients.
Additionally, doctors are angry with lawyers about malpractice
suits. To take revenge upon lawyers, doctors refuse to cooperate with
the legal process. Although a doctor's litigation assistance could ben-
efit a patient, some doctors will not render assistance because it
would help benefit the patient's lawyer as well.
Patients must be protected from physician retaliation. The pub-
lic interest in health and well-being requires that physicians, lawyers,
states, and consumers join in an effort to improve physician-patient
and physician-lawyer relationships. Doctors, lawyers, and patients
must try to communicate more openly and honestly with each other.
States should impose a duty upon doctors to render litigation assis-
216. Admittedly, this type of organization will probably function best in smaller com-
munities. Citizens in smaller communities seem to have a stronger desire to cooperate with
each other.
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tance on behalf of a patient as part of total patient care. Professional
medical organizations should enforce their ethics codes and disci-
pline doctors that violate code provisions.
A physician should not lose the freedom to choose whom to
serve. However, doctors must remember that, as fiduciaries, they
have a moral and ethical obligation to provide services to whomever
they are able to treat. Ethical standards of behavior are often more
stringent than legal standards. Ethics-based medical care, rather
than contract-based care, encourages commitment to serve those who
need to be served, despite potential risks.
Dorothy M. Allison

